Why Does God Allow Children to Suffer? A Comparative Religious View

Judaism has never offered a single, tidy answer to why innocent children suffer — and its greatest thinkers have insisted that intellectual honesty demands we resist easy answers. The Hebrew term for this problem is tzaddik ve-ra lo (the righteous who suffer), and it runs through the Tanakh from Genesis to the Psalms.

The Book of Job is the tradition's most sustained engagement with innocent suffering. Job's children are killed at the outset, and the entire drama turns on whether God owes an explanation. The rabbis of the Talmudic period (c. 200–500 CE) debated whether suffering is always disciplinary (yissurin shel ahavah, 'afflictions of love') or whether some suffering is simply beyond human comprehension. Rabbi Yannai, quoted in the Babylonian Talmud (Berakhot 7a), admitted: 'It is not in our power to explain the prosperity of the wicked or the suffering of the righteous.'

Medieval philosopher Maimonides (1138–1204) argued in Guide for the Perplexed (III:12) that most human suffering stems from human choices and the material nature of the world, not divine punishment — a view that partially shields children from any notion of deserved suffering. By contrast, Nachmanides (1194–1270) leaned more heavily on the idea that souls carry spiritual debts across lifetimes, though this kabbalistic view remains contested.

After the Holocaust, theologians like Eliezer Berkovits and Emil Fackenheim forced a reckoning: how could the murder of 1.5 million Jewish children be reconciled with a providential God? Berkovits' concept of hester panim ('the hiding of God's face') — drawn from Deuteronomy 31:17 — suggests God temporarily withdraws to preserve human freedom, even at catastrophic cost. This is not a comfortable answer, and Judaism largely resists pretending it is.

Christian theology approaches child suffering through several overlapping frameworks: the fallen world, divine discipline, eschatological hope, and the mystery of providence. None of these fully 'solves' the problem, and honest theologians from Augustine to C.S. Lewis have said so.

First, the fallen-world argument: most mainstream Christian theology holds that suffering entered creation through human sin (Genesis 3), meaning children suffer not because God wills it directly but because they are born into a broken world. Paul's language in Romans 8 about 'the whole creation groaning' supports this reading.

Second, the disciplinary argument. The letter to the Hebrews offers a striking analogy: 'If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son is he whom the father chasteneth not?' Hebrews 12:7 This frames suffering as potentially formative rather than punitive — though theologians like Jürgen Moltmann (b. 1926) have warned strongly against applying this to child suffering in ways that excuse injustice or abuse.

Third, and perhaps most pastorally significant, Jesus himself placed children at the center of the kingdom. In all three Synoptic Gospels he rebuked his disciples for keeping children away: 'Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God.' Mark 10:14Luke 18:16 This suggests children hold a privileged spiritual status, not a punished one.

Contemporary theologians like Alvin Plantinga (b. 1932) use the 'free will defense' to argue God permits suffering to preserve genuine human freedom, while John Hick (1922–2012) proposed 'soul-making theodicy' — the idea that a world without suffering couldn't produce moral depth. Critics, including Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov (a fictional but theologically serious voice), argue no eschatological reward justifies a single child's tear. Christianity holds the tension without fully resolving it.

Islamic theology addresses child suffering primarily through the doctrines of qadar (divine decree), ibtila (divine testing), and divine mercy. The Quran repeatedly affirms that God does not wrong anyone — 'wa la yazlimu rabbuka ahadan' (Surah 18:49) — which means suffering, including that of children, must be understood within a framework of ultimate divine justice even when the immediate cause is opaque to humans.

On the specific fate of children who die young, there is near-consensus among classical scholars: children who die before the age of moral accountability (bulugh) go directly to paradise. Ibn al-Qayyim (1292–1350) devoted considerable attention to this in Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimma and related works, arguing the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) confirmed in hadith (Sahih Muslim) that children of believers — and according to some scholars, all children — are in paradise.

The broader question of why God permits suffering at all is addressed through the concept of ibtila: trials are a sign of God's love and a means of spiritual elevation. The Prophet is reported to have said: 'The greatest reward comes with the greatest trial. When Allah loves a people He tests them.' (Sunan Ibn Majah, graded hasan). This doesn't mean God causes child abuse or disease with indifference; Islamic ethics strongly obligates humans to relieve suffering wherever possible — the suffering is permitted, not celebrated.

Scholar and philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) and later Ash'arite theologians argued that God's wisdom (hikma) may include purposes humans cannot perceive. The Mu'tazilite school, by contrast, insisted God must have a rationally discernible reason for every act — a minority position today but historically significant. Contemporary scholar Hamza Yusuf (b. 1958) has emphasized that Islam asks believers to hold grief and trust simultaneously, without demanding God justify himself to human reason.

Jewish Scripture affirms that children are not to be punished for the wrongdoing of their parents, grounding communal justice in individual responsibility 2 Chronicles 25:42 Kings 14:6. These legal statements show a commitment to shielding children from vicarious penalty, even amid the harsh realities of violence and crime 2 Chronicles 25:42 Kings 14:6. The wisdom dialogue in Job includes a voice that links children’s suffering to their own sin, presenting a stark retributive claim inside a debated conversation about suffering Job 8:4. These passages collectively highlight justice and moral accountability while acknowledging the problem of innocent pain remains textually unresolved here 2 Chronicles 25:42 Kings 14:6Job 8:4.

In the Gospels, Jesus welcomes children and declares that the kingdom belongs to such as them, foregrounding their dignity and privileged place before God Matthew 19:14Luke 18:16Mark 10:14. These sayings do not explain the mechanics of suffering, but they center God’s care and honor toward children as a theological baseline amid suffering Matthew 19:14Luke 18:16Mark 10:14.

The Qur’an prohibits killing children and reassures that God provides for them and their families, making child-harm a grave sin and rooting care in divine providence Quran 17:31Quran 17:31. Another verse observes that some idolaters came to see child-killing as acceptable and states that, had God willed otherwise, they would not have done so, acknowledging the tension between divine will and human wrongdoing Quran 6:137. These teachings condemn direct harm and frame suffering within God’s provision and permission, not approval, of evil acts Quran 17:31Quran 17:31Quran 6:137.